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Force, Power, and Law
DOM DAVID GRANFIELD*
I
"PowER, UNQUALIFIED AND UNSPECIFIED, is one of the vaguest notions in the
history of human thought."' But power, elusive though it may be, is clearly
operative in law. The word may mean simply what H. L. A. Hart means when
he calls the Austinian imperative theory, "the gunman situation writ large." 2
Or it may mean what Coke meant when he answered James I and his claim
to rule by divine right by quoting Brackton's: "Ipse enim rex non debet sub
homine sed sub deo et lege, quia lex facit regem."3 Whether power is on the
physical level of force or the moral level of authority, whether it is on both
levels or whether the two levels are equivalent, power is of utmost juridical
importance.
Arrest, which puts a person in the control and custody of the law, is a
crucial instance of power in action. The elements apparent here are signifi-
cant. The one who arrests must be authorized by a special warrant or by the
general law permitting an officer or private person to arrest without a warrant
under certain circumstances. When the arrest is made, the authority and
intention of the one arresting must be communicated to the suspect. 4 But
* Associate Professor of Law, The School of Law, The Catholic University of America.
Hall, Unification of Political and Legal Theory, 69 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY 15, 17
(1954).
1 Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REv. 593, 603
(1958).
' Coke, Prohibitions Del Roy, 12 Co. Rep. 63 (K.B. 1612).
'E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1961) provides: "The officer may break any outer or inner door
or window of a house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search
warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when
necessary to liberate himself or a person aiding him in the execution of the warrant."
Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958), applies these requirements to an entry for the
purpose of making of an arrest without a warrant. Keiningham V. United States, 109 U.S.
App. D.C. 272, 287 F. 2d 126 (1960), applies these requirements to an entry for the purpose
of making an arrest with a valid arrest warrant.
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authority and intention are not enough; physical force, actual or constructive,
is required. A true arrest is always a privileged imprisonment and may involve
a privileged assault or battery. In Kelly v. United States, the Court spelled out
the coercive element in arrest:
In order for there to be an arrest it is not necessary for there to be an applica-
tion of actual force, or manual touching of the body or physical restraint which
may be visible to the eye. It is sufficient if the person arrested understand that
he is in the power of the one arresting and submits in consequence. 5
The touching is token force, the submission is the acknowledgement of
superior power. The touching is sufficient without submission, the submission
is sufficient without a touching. However, some situations require more than
a symbolic use of coercion. The one who arrests has the right to use all the
force that is reasonably necessary if the suspect resists arrest or merely flees
lawful arrest, but he cannot use deadly force unless the suspect is charged
with a felony dangerous to life. Once the arrest has been made and the suspect
is in legal custody, reasonable force may be used to prevent escape. If the
prisoner attacks the one who arrested him, all reasonable and even deadly
force may be used. If the prisoner merely flees, only reasonable and non-
deadly force may be used unless the crime is a felony dangerous to life.
The problem of arrest with its complexus of authority and coercion, of
rights and duties, shows vividly the strong arm of the law. A man may follow
his own will for years without any concern for law or its power. So long as he
does not happen to violate a law or to be apprehended doing so, the law for
him may, subjectively, be non-existent. But once arrested, he is no longer his
own man. The law now painfully impinges on his life. Legal phenomena
become existential realities to be coped with at his peril. No longer fully free,
he becomes subject to the machinery of justice, to authority and coercion and
the indignities of police administration. He must face up to the fact of power.
II
Power, according to the Aristotelian categories, is a species of quality, an
accident consequent on form. "A power or capacity is a proper qualitative
accident which makes an agent immediately able to perform a certain type of
action."6 Another species of quality is the passive power which is defined as
"the state resulting in a corporeal being from the action of its environment
upon it."7 When these two species are actualized, they must be reclassified in
111 U.S. App. D.C. 396, 398, 298 F. 2d 310, 312 (1961).
6 HART, THOMISTIC METAPHYSICS 226 (1959).
7 1bid.
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the categories of action and passion respectively. These distinctions are im-
portant to the general problem of power. For example, Aquinas states, in
terms of the eternal law, a principle which is applied analogously on other
levels:
The good are perfectly subject to the eternal law, as always acting according to it;
whereas the wicked are subject to the eternal law, imperfectly as to their actions,
indeed, since both their knowledge of good and their inclination thereto are
imperfect. But this imperfection on the part of action is supplied on the part of
passion, in so far as they suffer what the eternal law decrees concerning them,
according as they fail to act in harmony with that law.8
Man is gifted with many powers. Some he shares with other beings, the
chemical and physical, the vegetative, and the animal powers. But some are
exclusively human. It is this type of power that is our primary concern. As
Tillich observes, "Physicists are usually conscious of the fact that they use an
anthropomorphic metaphor when they use the term 'power.' Power is a
sociological category and from there it is transferred to nature (just as is
law.. .)."9 When Russell defines power as "the production of intended
effects,"' 0 he is, by his use of the word "intended," thinking of power on the
human level. The implications in such power are brought out by Guardini:
"We may speak of power in the true sense of the word only when two
elements are present: real energies capable of changing the reality of things,
of determining their conditions and interrelations; and awareness of those
energies, the will to establish specific goals and to launch and direct energies
toward these goals."" These two elements, intelligence and responsibility,
give power a truly human dimension. The goal, which is first in the order of
intention, is finally achieved through the human actualization of those powers
which move reality. Since the action is freely intended, and is neither de-
termined nor accidental, it can be predicated of the agent as his own action.
Power can be directed towards persons or things. Our main concern is
power over human beings without forgetting that "the chief cause of change
in the modern world is the increased power over matter that we owe to
science."'1 2 Since Russell wrote those words, the "Second Industrial Revolu-
tion," based on cybernetics and the "intelligent machines" of automation
have extended not only the frontiers of man's mastery of nature, but also the
areas of communication and control of other men. Machines will not, as
Samuel Butler envisaged in Erewhon, enslave mankind all by themselves; but
a ST. THOMAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, I-II, 93, 6 c [Hereafter cited S. TH.].
0 TILLICH, LOVE, POWER, AND JUsTIcE 7 (1954).10 RusSELL, POWER 25 (1938).
GUARDINI, POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY 2 (1961).
"RussELL, op. cit. supra note 10, at 25.
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machines ci gouverner may well augment, in a way not hitherto experienced
in history, the power of state influence in politics, economics, and public
opinion, creating thereby a growing threat to future liberty.13
Jurists and political scientists use the word power to refer primarily to
heteronomous decision: "The distinction and noteworthy sign of power con-
sists in the power to choose for others." 14 Lasswell develops, in an empirical
context, this notion of power as a decision-making function, a special kind of
policy-making. "When the policies are expected to be enforced against an
obstructor by the imposition of extreme deprivations, we have decision, which
is a power relation."' 5 If law is defined as "authoritative decision,"' 6 and de-
cision as "a policy involving severe sanctions (deprivations) ,,7 and power as
"participation in the making of decisions,"' 8 then we have a fundamental
juridic relationship: "G has power over H with respect to the values k, if G
participates in the making of decisions affecting the k policies of H."' 9 In
other words, policy implies a value judgment applied to facts, which policy
is established as a legal norm when it is authoritatively implemented by the
imposition of severe sanctions for its violation. The law so established makes
a choice: it commands or forbids specified conduct under pain of punishment.
So far, this analysis of power has not given a definitive answer to a question
which is basic: why does one man obey another? This question has special
cogency today in this country where political equality and civil rights are part
of the charter of democracy. The easy answer might be the Staatszwang, the
coercive power of the civil authority. This answer is unsatisfying; it fails to
correspond with the facts of society as we know them. Yves Simon phrases the
problem more pointedly: "On the one hand, it seems to be impossible to
account for social life without assuming that one man can bind the conscience
of his neighbor; on the other hand, it is not easy to see how a man can ever
enjoy such power." 20 What exactly is the basis of civil authority? Coercion,
moral obligation, or a combination of both?
18 Cf, BELL, INTELLIGENT MACHINES (1962); WIENER, THE HUMAN USE OF HUMAN BEINGS
(2d ed. 1954) ; SIMON, PHILOSOPHY OF DEMOCRACY, Ch. 5: Democracy and Technology 260
(1951).
14 Reale, Law and Power and their Correlatives, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE IN HONOR OF
ROSCOE POUND 247 (Newman ed. 1962).
15 LASSWELL, POWER AND PERSONALITY 18 (1948).
10 ARENS & LASSWELL, IN DEFENSE OF THE PUBLIC ORDER 9 (1961). This book is a stimulating
and comprehensive study of the "emerging field of sanction law." An older, but still im-
portant book, written more from a jurisprudential than a sociological point of view is
ROONEY, LAWLESSNESS, LAW, AND SANCTION (1937).
17 LASSWELL, op. cit. supra note 15, at 223.
'a Ibid.
"sIbid.
20 SIMON, PHILOSOPHY OF DEMOCRACY 145 (1951).
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III
Russell's use of the term "naked power" is helpful. He defines it thus: "Power
is naked when its subjects respect it solely because it is power and not for any
other reason.' '21 And again: "I call power naked when it results from the
power-loving impulses of individuals or groups, and wins from its subjects
only submission through fear, not active cooperation." 22 The classic formula-
tion of this position is found in Plato. In the Republic, Thrasymachus says,
"My doctrine is that justice is simply the interest of the stronger." 23 In the
Gorgias, Callicles says, "It is just that the stronger dominate the weaker." 24
What happens if naked power becomes its own justification? Del Vecchio
answers succinctly: "If one asserts that Law is equal to force one takes away
the possibility of any distinction between right and wrong and, consequently,
of any evaluation of justice and injustice." 25 Far from might making right,
the sovereignty of might would destroy right. When force is the paramount
value to which all else is subordinated, rule by law becomes meaningless. "We
can," insists Del Vecchio, "conceive, by hypothesis, the absence of any Law,
but if there be a right, it is superior, logically, to force and the simple physical
possibility of a fact cannot in any case signify conformity to a juridical crite-
rion."26 Law cannot be identified with force and still preserve its existence.
Nevertheless, he states, "Law is essentially coercible; that is, in case of non-
observance, it is possible to make it prevail by force. '27 The basis for this
position is that law is an imperative which establishes a relationship between
persons in terms of rights and duties. For example, the ancient right to torture
a suspect was based on the legal duty of the suspect to tell the truth. When the
problem was formulated as the defendant's right to silence or right against
self-incrimination, "third degree" techniques, modern or medieval, were not
justifiable. The duty of the state would be to refrain from trying to elicit
coerced confessions. 28 A legal right can be promoted and protected by the use
of force. In fact, without coercibility, law and order would degenerate into
anarchy. Ihering makes this point vividly: "Powerlessness, impotence of the
State force, is the capital sin of the State, from which there is no absolution;
a sin which society neither forgives nor tolerates. It is an inner contradiction:
State force without force!"29
" RUSSELL, op. cit. supra note 10, at 66 (1938).
22Id. at 28.
2PLATO, REPUBLIC 338 c.
PLATO, GORGIAS 483 d.
2DEL VECCHIO, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 260 (8th ed. Martin transl. 1953).
21 Id. at 261.
2Id. at 297.28 See P. GRANFIELD, THE THEOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEFENDANT'S OBLIGATION TO
REPLY IN A CIvIL COURT (1962).
* IHERING, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END 234 (1924).
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A hasty analysis of the coercive aspect of power might seem to limit it to
criminal law. Force is most obviously present in this area of public law, yet
it is fundamental to all law. When the plaintiff gets an award in a tort case
because of the harm that resulted from the defendant's negligence, the state
deprives the defendant of his property as truly as if it had imposed a fine on
him. The loss may be labelled compensatory rather than punitive, yet the
deprivation is wrought by means of the coercive power of the state, without
which laws and judgments would be no more effective than the advice of the
man next door.
Coercibility underlies all law, but physical force is of itself incapable of
guaranteeing obedience. "No community can stand the social cost of coercing
forty-nine percent of its citizens to do something they do not want to do,
except on very rare occasions. '" 0 Even if cost were no object, there would still
be the fact that all human force is limited. "There exists no pure coercion, no
more than there exists full consent. The militarist's dream of power enough
to force his own unimpeded way is as hypothetical as the ideal of anarchy.
Neither has ever existed. Neither now exists. Neither can exist." 31 Nikolai
Berdyaev remarks, "But life is full of unnoticed, more refined forms of
violence."3 2 Among others, he mentions the power of opinion and the power
of money. Power over minds and power over property implement strict
political power.33 They tend to develop the consent which is even more
necessary than coercion to the existence of the state. Russell wrote: "Power
not based on tradition or assent, I call 'naked' power."3 4 For him, traditional
power has the habitual or customary assent of the governed. Revolutionary
power, though newly acquired and lacking the tradition of respect and
obedience, is based on assent to a new creed or program or sentiment'. It
replaces traditional authority and in its turn tends to become traditional,
though in the face of opposition it may have the qualities of naked power.
Naked power acts without assent or tradition and rests on naked force. But
that, too, tends to become traditional35 or to be replaced. In fact, for a regime
of naked power to perdure, there must be, at least, half-hearted support.
Berdyaev writes of a great anomaly. "Man seeks freedom. There is within him
go COHEN, THE MEANING OF HUMAN HISTORY 245 (4th ed. Husick Transl., vol. I, DER ZWECK
IM RECHT 1903).
81 Smith, Consent and Coercion in Governing, 1 THE PACIFIC SPECTATOR 317 (1947).
2 BERDYAEV, SLAVERY AND FREEDOM 64 (1944).
"See BERLE) POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY (1959) ; MILLS, THE POWER ELITE (1956).
" RUSSELL, POWER 27 (1938).
"See STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW 709-12 (1961) on depersonalization of
power: "the readiness of an individual to submit to authority is increased by the awareness
of similar submission by others and decreased by awareness of their resistance"; and trans-
personalization of power: "the reinforcement of power by associating it with some idea or
principle which transcends the dominating persons."
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an immense drive towards freedom, and yet not only does he easily fall into
slavery, but he even loves slavery. Man is a king and a slave."3 6 If a man is not
truly a free man, if he is exteriorized, objectivized, or alienated, then he falls
into one or the other of the two correlatives: master or slave.
If the consciousness of a master is consciousness of the existence of some other
for him, the consciousness of the slave is the existence of himself for the other.
The consciousness of the free man, on the other hand, is consciousness of the
existence of each one for himself, but with a free outgoing from himself to the
other and to all. The boundary of a state of slavery is the absence of awareness
of it.37
If in society some coercion is always necessary, it is even truer that some
element of consent is necessary or there can be no society to coerce. Coercion
may preserve society, but it is consent which establishes it. Only through
continuously present consent can society be conserved in existence; on this
consensual foundation does coercion play its limited part.
Paul Tillich tries to work out the relationship of power and compulsion.
He begins with the notion of ontological power which includes "sociological
power, namely the chance to carry through one's will against social resist-
ance."3 8 His basic notion is this: "The power of being is its possibility to
affirm itself against the non-being within it and against it. The power of a
being is the greater the more non-being is taken into its self-affirmation."3 9
This affirming of one's own worth and dignity in spite of surrounding evils,
is the courage to be. Yet courage and power are not separate from love. Self-
affirmation is needed in order to destroy what is against love. Tillich adopts
Luther's phrase that compulsion is the strange work of love. He points out
that "the basic formula of power and the basic formula of love are identical:
Separation and Reunion or Being taking Non-Being into itself." 40 In this, he
parallels the words of Berdyaev: "Power in a most profound sense means the
taking possession of that to which it is directed; not domination, in which
externality is always maintained, but a persuasive, inwardly subjugating
union. Christ speaks with power. A tyrant never speaks with power." 41
In speaking of the "courage to be a part," Tillich develops that aspect of
power which is the concern of law and politics. He writes: "The self affirma-
tion of the self as an individual self always includes the affirmation of the
power of being in which the self participates. The self affirms itself as partici-
- BERDYAEV, op. cit. Supra note 32 at 59.
M Id. at 60.
88 TILLIcH, Lov, POWER, AND JUSTICE 36 (1960).
8Id. at 48.
40 Id. at 49.
" BmRADv, op. cit. supra note 32, at 66-67.
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pant in the power of a group, of a movement, of essences, of the power of
being as such."42 Compulsion on the part of society is justified by its self-affir-
mation against the evils which threaten it from within and without. Yet always
the aim is positive, directed toward good, for it is the strange, often tragic,
but necessary work of love.
IV
Luther's reference to compulsion as love's strange work makes the thomistic
"virtue of vengeance" sound less paradoxical. Perhaps we have seen too much
of organized sadism to feel easy about calling vengeance virtuous. Actually,
the vindicatio that St. Thomas praises has not the pejorative connotations of
revenge or vindictiveness. The word comes from vindicare, to punish, and
refers to punishment inflicted for a wrong done even when the purpose is, as
for St. Thomas, rehabilitative and medicinal. Vengeance is a virtue concerned
with the moderate use of authorized coercion, with the proper function of
punishment. The virtue shines forth when we remove the dark vices related
to it: "one by way of excess, namely, the sin of cruelty or brutality, which
exceeds the measure in punishing; while the other is a vice by way of defi-
ciency and consists in being remiss in punishing."43 The former leads to
tyranny, the latter to anarchy; but true vengeance to peace and order. "For
the virtue of vengeance consists in observing the due measure of vengeance
with regard to all the circumstances."'44
The touchstone of the virtue is the end or purpose for which coercion is
used. "Vengeance is lawful and virtuous so far as it tends to the prevention of
evil." 45 St. Thomas examines the avenger to see if his intentions are honorable.
"If the avenger's intention be directed chiefly to some good to be obtained by
means of the punishment of the person who has sinned (for instance that the
sinner may amend or at least that he may be restrained and others be not
disturbed, that justice may be upheld, and God honored), then vengeance
may be lawful, provided other due circumstances be observed. ' 46 Note that
the first purpose expressed by Aquinas is the rehabilitation of the offender;
for this is a work of vengeance.
The harmony that exists between true vengeance and the natural law rests,
for St. Thomas, on those elemental human drives or tendencies which are
common to all men. He gives here a rationale which lifted to the political
level justifies state coercion.
"TILLICH, THE COURAGE TO BE 87 (1959).
S.TH., II-II, 108, 2 ad 3.
Ibid.
"Id. at 3 c.
"Id. at 1 c.
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Aptitude to virtue is in us by nature, but the complement of virtue is in us
through habituation or some other cause. Hence, it is evident that virtues perfect
us so that we follow in due manner our natural inclinations, which belong to the
natural law. Wherefore to every definite natural inclination there corresponds a
special virtue. Now there is a special inclination of nature to remove harm, for
which reason animals have the irascible power distinct from the concupiscible.
Man resists harm by defending himself against wrongs lest they be inflicted upon
him, with the intention, not of harming but of removing the harm done. And
this belongs to vengeance.47
In De Regimine Principum, St. Thomas indicates the role of coercion in a
well-ordered state. In the fifteenth chapter he writes of the principal concern
of the ruler-"the means by which the multitude subject to him may live
well." 48 First of all, the ruler must establish the life of virtue in his people,
by uniting them in peace, by guiding them to good deeds, and by providing
a sufficiency of things necessary for good living. Secondly, he must conserve
public virtue by replacing sick or deceased officials and by protecting the
multitude from crime within the community and from war outside it. Thirdly,
he must be solicitous for social betterment by correcting disorders, supplying
defects, and by doing everything as well as possible.
Our main concern is the power of the ruler against those impediments to
the common good which "consist in the perversity of the wills of men, inas-
much as they are either too lazy to perform what the state demands, or still
further, they are harmful to the peace of society because, by transgressing
justice, they disturb the peace of their neighbors." 49 The solution for this
perennial social problem is found in the use of negative and positive sanctions.
"By his law and orders, punishments and rewards, he restrains the men subject
to him from wickedness, and encourages them to works of virtue, following
the example of God, Who gave His law to man and requites those who observe
it with rewards and those who transgress it with punishments." 50 As for war,
the enemy without, Aquinas says, "It would be useless to prevent internal
dangers if the multitude could not be defended against external dangers." 51
The power of coercion or the right to vengeance clearly must be the
prerogative of the state if the people are to live well. While recognizing the
medicinal character of the punishments of this life, 52 Aquinas does not over-
look the more fundamental reasons of prevention and deterrence, the psycho-
' Id. at 2 c.
ST. THOMAs, DE REGIMINE PRINCIPUM 102, ch 15 (Phelan transl. 1938).
19 Id. at 104.
0 Ibid.
1Id. at 105.
51 S.TH., II-II, 108, 3 ad 2.
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logical basis of which together with its typical modes, he spells out in the
following passage.
Vengeance is lawful and virtuous so far as it tends to the prevention of evil.
Now some who are not influenced by motives of virtue are prevented from com-
mitting sin., through fear of losing those things which they love more than those
they obtain by sinning, else fear would be no restraint to sin. Consequently,
vengeance for sin should be taken by depriving a man of what he loves most.
Now the things which man loves most are life, bodily safety, his own freedom,
and external goods such as riches, his country, and his good name. Wherefore,
according to Augustine's reckoning (De Civ. Dei, XXI), Tully writes that the
laws recognize either kinds of punishment: namely, death whereby a man is
deprived of his life; stripes, retaliation or the loss of eye for eye, whereby man
forfeits his bodily safety; slavery and imprisonment, whereby he is deprived of
freedom; exile, whereby he is banished from his country; fines whereby he is
mulcted in his riches; ignominy whereby he loses his good name. 53
As might be expected, the relationship between power and law is implicit
in St. Thomas' classic definition of law: "An ordinance of reason for the
common good, made by him who has care of the community and promul-
gated."5 4 Law is a rationis ordinatio. Law is more than a speculative judg-
ment or intellectual grasp of truth. "Law is a rule and measure of acts,
whereby a man is induced to act or is restrained from acting; for lex (law) is
derived from ligare (to bind), because it binds one to act."5 5 Yet the law is
more than the mere will of the sovereign, a voluntaristic fiat. "In order that
the volition of what is commanded may have the nature of law, it needs to be
in accord with some rule of reason. And in this sense is to be understood the
saying that the will of the sovereign has the force of law; otherwise the
sovereign's will would savour of lawlessness rather than law." 56 The second
and third elements of the definition together, also, imply coercibility. "To
order anything to the common good belongs either to the whole people or to
someone who is the vicegerent of the whole people."'57 Not anyone can make
a law. "A private person cannot lead another to virtue efficaciously; for he
can only advise and if his advice is not taken, it has no coercive power, such
as the law should have in order to prove an efficacious inducement to virtue.
But this coercive power is vested in the whole people or in some public
personage to whom it belongs to inflict penalties."58
5 d. at 3 c.
' S.TH., I-II, 90, 4 c.
"Id. at 1 c.
MId. at ad 3.
Id. at 3 c.
Id. at ad 2; cf. S.TH., II-II, 64 c.
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Aquinas' position on power and the law is clear. "The notion of law con-
tains two things: first that it is a rule of human acts; secondly, that it has
coercive power." 59 He asserts that all are subject to the law either as the
regulated are subject to the regulator, or as the coerced are subject to the
coercer. Ihering's analysis of the formal elements of law help us grasp the full
implications of St. Thomas' legal theory. Ihering says that law includes three
things, norm, coercion and content. The first two are the formal elements, the
norm containing the inner side of law, coercion the outer. He shows the
relation of these two elements:
The content of the norm is an idea, a proposition (legal rule), but a proposi-
tion of a practical kind, i.e., a direction for human conduct ... it designates a
direction for another's will, which he should follow, i.e., every norm is an
imperative (positive-command, negative-prohibition). An imperative has
meaning only in the mouth of him who has the power to impose such a limitation
upon another's will; it is the stronger will that designates the line of conduct for
the weaker. An imperative presupposes a double will; it passes from a person to a
person; nature herself knows no imperatives. 60
To grasp the relationship of law and power, it is necessary to conceive of
law dynamically. Law is not simply a statement of policy, an appeal to reason-
ableness; it is a formative instrument which gets results either by regulating
conduct or by coercing where there is misconduct. Law gives the state its
structure, its ordered harmony. Without coercibility there is no law. Without
law there is anarchy. Law sets up a pattern of achievement as a practical ideal,
in that it moves those subject to it toward the realization of that complex goal
which is the common good. The rule of law may be accepted because of virtue,
because of fear, or because of reason,61 but if it is rejected, the coercive power
of the state is there to protect the common good despite the deviations of its
subjects. Law is an imperative-a command backed by force. It is more than
a mere imperative; it is an ordinance of reason, a reasonable command and
not just an authoritative one. With reasonableness alone, it would not be a
command. With only imperativeness, it would not be a law. Law is a rational
imperative. Yet without coercibility essentially united with it, it would be an
empty wish, a powerless precept.
9 Id. at 96, 5 c.
60 IHERING, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END 247 (4th ed. Husik transl. Vol. I, DER ZWECK IM
RECHT 1903) In a note on p. 161 Vol. II of the 1886 edition Ihering wrote of Aquinas: "Now
that I have come to know this vigorous thinker, I cannot help asking myself how it was
possible that truths such as he has taught have been so completely forgotten among our
Protestant scholars. What errors could have been avoided if people kept these doctrines! ...
For my part, if I had known them earlier, I probably would not have written my whole
book; for the fundamental ideas which I have treated here are found expressed in full clarity
and in a convincing manner by this powerful thinker."
61 S.TH., I-1I, 90, 1, ad 2.
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V
A command may be reasonable and be backed by severe sanctions without
being a law, if it lacks authority. Leo XIII gives us the structure in which is
found the rightful use of power:
No man has in himself or of himself the power of constraining the free will of
others by bonds of authority of this nature. This power resides solely in God,
the Creator and Legislator of all things, and it is necessary that those who
exercise it should do so as having received it from God. "There is one lawgiver
and judge who is able to destroy and deliver." James 4:12. And this is clearly
evident in every kind of power.62
The philosophic basis for this statement is in the overlordship of God as
Creator. "God has full and principal dominion over each and every creature,
totally subjected to his power." 63 Although His dominion is perfect, it exists
in a participated form among men. "Man shares a certain similitude of divine
dominion, according to which he has a particular power over some man or
some creature." 64 To understand the vertical aspects of power is to think not
in terms of material goods or material force but rather in terms of rights
possessed by essence or by participation. Maritain gives the basic insight by
speaking of vicariousness instead of physical transfer. He writes:
If a material good is owned by the one, it cannot be owned by the other and
there can only be the question of transfer of ownership or a donation. But a
right can be possessed by the one as belonging to his nature, and by the other as
participated in by him. God is possessed by essence of the right to command; the
people are possessed of this right both by participation in the divine right, and
by essence insofar as it is a human right. The "vicars" of the people or deputies
for the people are possessed (really possessed) of this right only by participation
in the people's right.65
Power, like law, is an analogous term. It may refer to brute force; it may
refer to divine omnipotence. Juridical power is on two levels: it gets its
authority from God, yet it depends on coercion for its full effectiveness. Even
when the balance of physical power is weighted against what is right, might
does not fully triumph. "There is no power but from God, and those that are,
are ordained of God."60 However limited the sanctions that legitimate author-
12Leo XIII, Encyclical, Diuturnum, (June 29, 1881).
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ity can muster, the established law binds in conscience. In other words, God,
who has shared his power with human beings, implements their own weak
coercive strength with His omnipotence. Divine coercibility is the ultimate
sanction which makes human rights inalienable. No matter how great the
force used against it, right is right. What legitimate human power cannot
protect, is protected by divine vengeance. And yet neither divine nor human
power are ordained toward vengeance, but rather toward man's full realiza-
tion of perfection and happiness.
